A mutual primal-dual linear programming algorithm

A new primal-dual linear programming algorithm is exhibited. A proof is given that optimal solutions to both primal and dual problems (when such solutions exist) are found in a finite number of steps by this algorithm. A numerical example is included to illustrate the method.     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Parallel machine scheduling with batch deliveries to minimize total flow time and delivery cost

Motivated by the flow of products in the iron and steel industry, we study an identical and parallel machine scheduling problem with batch deliveries, where jobs finished on the parallel machines are delivered to customers in batches. Each delivery batch has a capacity and incurs a cost. The objective is to find a coordinated production and delivery schedule that minimizes the total flow time of jobs plus the total delivery cost. This problem is an extension of the problem considered by Hall and Potts, Ann Oper Res 135 (2005) 41–64, who studied a two‐machine problem with an unbounded number of transporters and unbounded delivery capacity. We first provide a dynamic programming algorithm to solve a special case with a given job assignment to the machines. A heuristic algorithm is then presented for the general problem, and its worst‐case performance ratio is analyzed. The computational results show that the heuristic algorithm can generate near‐optimal solutions. Finally, we offer a fully polynomial‐time approximation scheme for a fixed number of machines. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 492–502, 2016     

On hazard rate processes

Hazard rate processes are discussed in the context of doubly stochastic Poisson processes. We derive an explicit expression for the reliability function corresponding to an increasing hazard rate processes with independent increments. Also, bounds are obtained for the reliability function of a system with a general hazard rate process.     

The constrained shortest path problem

The shortest path problem between two specified nodes in a general network possesses the unimodularity property and, therefore, can be solved by efficient labelling algorithms. However, the introduction of an additional linear constraint would, in general, destroy this property and the existing algorithms are not applicable in this case. This paper presents a parametric approach for solving this problem. The algorithm presented would require, on the average, a number of iterations which is polynomially bounded. The similarity of this approach to that of the generalized Lagrange multiplier technique is demonstrated and a numerical example is presented.     

Influence of a liquid-filled compartment structure on the incoming shaped charge jet stability

Liquid-filled compartment structure consists of a bulk steel plate with matrix blind holes which are filled with liquid and a steel front plate to seal up the liquid with rings and bolts.The liquid-filled compart-ment structure can resist the shaped charge warhead effectively.This paper presents experimental and theoretical investigations of the penetration ability of the residual shaped charge jet emerging from the liquid-filled compartment structure after the penetration process at different impact angles.On the basis of shock wave propagation theory,the influence of the liquid-filled compartment structure on jet sta-bility is analysed.The interferences of the liquid backflow caused by a reflected shock wave and a back plate on jet stability under different impact angles are also examined.In addition,the range of the disturbed velocity segments of the jet at different impact angles and the penetration ability of the re-sidual jet are obtained.A theoretical model is validated against the experimental penetration depths.     

An efficient SPH methodology for modelling mechanical characteristics of particulate composites

Particulate composites are one of the widely used materials in producing numerous state-of-the-art components in biomedical, automobile, aerospace including defence technology. Variety of modelling techniques have been adopted in the past to model mechanical behaviour of particulate composites. Due to their favourable properties, particle-based methods provide a convenient platform to model failure or fracture of these composites. Smooth particle hydrodynamics (SPH) is one of such methods which demonstrate excellent potential for modelling failure or fracture of particulate composites in a Lagrangian setting. One of the major challenges in using SPH method for modelling composite materials depends on accurate and efficient way to treat interface and boundary conditions. In this paper, a master-slave method based multi-freedom constraints is proposed to impose essential boundary conditions and interfacial displacement constraints in modelling mechanical behaviour of composite materials using SPH method. The proposed methodology enforces the above constraints more accurately and requires only smaller condition number for system stiffness matrix than the procedures based on typical penalty function approach. A minimum cut-off value-based error criteria is employed to improve the compu-tational efficiency of the proposed methodology. In addition, the proposed method is further enhanced by adopting a modified numerical interpolation scheme along the boundary to increase the accuracy and computational efficiency. The numerical examples demonstrate that the proposed master-slave approach yields better accuracy in enforcing displacement constraints and requires approximately the same computational time as that of penalty method.     

Supplier‐buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation

We consider the problem of designing a contract to maximize the supplier's profit in a one‐supplier–one‐buyer relationship for a short‐life‐cycle product. Demand for the finished product is stochastic and price‐sensitive, and only its probability distribution is known when the supply contract is written. When the supplier has complete information on the marginal cost of the buyer, we show that several simple contracts can induce the buyer to choose order quantity that attains the single firm profit maximizing solution, resulting in the maximum possible profit for the supplier. When the marginal cost of the buyer is private information, we show that it is no longer possible to achieve the single firm solution. In this case, the optimal order quantity is always smaller while the optimal sale price of the finished product is higher than the single firm solution. The supplier's profit is lowered while that of the buyer is improved. Moreover, a buyer who has a lower marginal cost will extract more profit from the supplier. Under the optimal contract, the supplier employs a cutoff level policy on the buyer's marginal cost to determine whether the buyer should be induced to sign the contract. We characterize the optimal cutoff level and show how it depends on the parameters of the problem. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 48: 41–64, 2001     

A search game with a protector

A classic problem in Search Theory is one in which a searcher allocates resources to the points of the integer interval [1, n] in an attempt to find an object which has been hidden in them using a known probability function. In this paper we consider a modification of this problem in which there is a protector who can also allocate resources to the points; allocating these resources makes it more difficult for the searcher to find an object. We model the situation as a two‐person non‐zero‐sum game so that we can take into account the fact that using resources can be costly. It is shown that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium when the searcher's probability of finding an object located at point i is of the form (1 − exp (−λ_ix_i)) exp (−μ_iy_i) when the searcher and protector allocate resources x_i and y_i respectively to point i. An algorithm to find this Nash equilibrium is given. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47:85–96, 2000     

On a ruckle problem in discrete games of ambush

The following zero-sum game is considered. Red chooses in integer interval [1, n] two integer intervals consisting of k and m points where k + m < n, and Blue chooses an integer point in [1, n]. The payoff to Red equals 1 if the point chosen by Blue is at least in one of the intervals chosen by Red, and 0 otherwise. This work complements the results obtained by Ruckle, Baston and Bostock, and Lee. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 44: 353–364, 1997